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ESSAY
CLIMATE CHANGE: THE EQUITY PROBLEM
Michael P. Vandenbergh*
Biooke A. Ackerly**
Income disparity in America affects the potential for environ-
mental reform. When environmental standards are imposed on
industry, the cost of consumer goods tends to rise, and low-income
consumers can be priced out of important goods and services. This
anticipated burden makes regulators less eager to impose stan-
dards that they know will raise prices. Opponents of regulation
frequently invoke this equity argument in aid of their opposition
argument.' Environmental standards that make certain goods
more energy efficient, for example, will be less effective if many
consumers cannot purchase the more efficient goods. With individ-
ual behavior accounting for a large share of many pollutants and
more than fifty million Americans (roughly eighteen percent of the
* Professor of Law and Co-Director, Regulatory Program, Vanderbilt University Law
School. This Essay was supported by funds from Vanderbilt Law School and the Vander-
bilt Center for the Study of Religion and Culture. We would like to thank the participants
at the Virginia Environmental Law Journal's Global Climate Change: Individual, Private
Sector, and State Responses Symposium and the editors of the Virginia Environmental
Law Journal. Linda Breggin, Lisa Bressman, Rebecca Brown, Jonathan Gilligan, and Bob
Rasmussen provided insights on this project. Chris Bowles, Casey Kuhlman, Monica
Mongillo, and Smith Podris provided research assistance.
** Associate Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University.
1 For example, opponents of more stringent automobile tailpipe standards point to the
costs imposed on consumers who cannot afford more expensive vehicles. See, e.g., John H.
Cushman, Jr., California Lawmakers Vote to Lower Auto Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, July 2,
2002, at A14 (noting that Dennis Hollingsworth, a state legislator from Murrieta and oppo-
nent of a California greenhouse gas tailpipe bill, said: "This will cost lives. The reason it
will cost lives is that it will price people out of the market. So they will keep their older
cars, which do not have the safety features of newer cars."). Similarly, opponents of strin-
gent electric utility emissions standards point to the effects of higher electricity prices on
the economically disadvantaged. BERNARD L. WEINSTEIN & TERRY L. CLOWER, CTR. FOR
ECON. DEV. AND RESEARCH, ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE V. DUKE ENERGY: HOW A
SUPREME COURT REVERSAL ON THE INTERPRETATION OF NEW SOURCE REVIEW COULD
IMPERIL RURAL AMERICA (2006), http://www.unt.edu/cedr/NewSourceReviewUpdate.pdf.
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population) living at or near the poverty line, this gap in regulatory
effectiveness is significant.2
Climate change dramatically illustrates this problem. Over the
last several years, many scientists and policymakers concluded that
reducing the risk of catastrophic climate change will require
prompt and substantial reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions. In the United States, individual behavior accounts for at
least one-third of the emissions of carbon dioxide, the leading
greenhouse gas, and reducing those emissions will require individu-
als as well as industries to change their behavior.' Many of the
potential solutions will increase the prices of consumer goods,
whether in the form of carbon taxes, efficiency standards for motor
vehicles and appliances, more stringent building codes for single
family homes and apartments, or carbon cap-and-trade require-
ments for electric utilities. Although some of these programs will
save money for consumers over the long run, many will require up-
front expenditures of funds that low-income individuals simply
cannot afford to make. In the absence of measures to address how
climate change policies intersect with pre-existing financial inequi-
ties, these policies will be less likely to be adopted, and they will
not achieve their regulatory potential if they are adopted. As with
other environmental regulations, objections to climate change
measures will come from both sides of the political spectrum.
Those on the right will contest the seriousness of the climate
change threat or object to government intervention, and those on
the left will raise the equity concern despite the risk of delaying
reductions in GHG emissions.
This Essay examines the climate change equity problem and the
legal options for addressing it. Recognizing the normative and
political import of environmental justice concerns, we seek an
approach to curbing individual carbon emissions that enhances the
2 Activities under the direct control of individuals generate a large share of many pollu-
tants in the United States. See, e.g., Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV:
The Individual as Regulated Entity in the New Era of Environmental Law, 57 VAD. L.
REV. 515, 547 (2004) (concluding that thirty-one percent of ozone precursor emissions are
attributable to individual behavior). Thirty-eight million Americans (13.3 percent of the
United States population) were living in poverty in 2005 and another thirteen million (4.4
percent) were within twenty-five percent of the poverty line. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
INCOME, EARNINGS, AND POVERTY DATA FROM THE 2005 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SUR-
VEY 19 (August 2006), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/acs-02.pdf. In this
Essay, we refer to these fifty-one million individuals living at or near the poverty line as
"low-income individuals."
3 Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne K. Steinemann, The Carbon-Neutral Individual, 82
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673, 1675 (2007).
HeinOnline  -- 26 Va. Envtl. L.J. 56 2008
2008] Climate Change: The Equity Problem 57
ability of those with greater discretion in their consumption pat-
terns to enable changes in consumption among those with less.4
Although many options are available, the most promising in the
near term is the extension of the growing retail carbon offset mar-
ket to those offsets generated by individuals and households, and
not industrial sources. We examine the viability of a family of
options based on the creation of an equity offset market that would
enable donors to subsidize the purchase of more efficient (and thus
less carbon-emitting) goods by low-income individuals. We then
draw on the growing private governance literature to examine the
potential role of private standard-setting and certification schemes
for this new carbon equity offset market, and we suggest that a
private offset scheme ultimately might be incorporated into the
proposed federal cap-and-trade schemes that now target industrial
sources.
The conceptual value of approaching the equity issue in this way
is significant. It encourages a sense of shared environmental
responsibility, which in turn could have beneficial effects on pollut-
ing behaviors. At the same time, it removes the incentive to use
"we-they" classifications that stymie legislative reforms while plac-
ing blame on sectors of the society that have the least ability to
modify their behavior.
4 The imposition of inequitable or unjust environmental burdens on particular individu-
als or groups is a common problem in environmental law. The most familiar example
concerns disproportionate exposure to toxics in low-income or minority communities.
Framed in this way, environmental justice concerns generate a robust literature that con-
ceptualizes environmental-economic impacts as tradeoffs with winners and losers. See, e.g.,
ROBERT D. BULLARD, THE QUEST FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS AND
THE POLITICS OF POLLUTION (2005); ROBERT D. BULLARD, ET AL., Toxic WASTES AND
RACE AT TWENTY: 1987-2007 (March 2007), available at http://www.ejrc.cau.edu/TWART-
light.pdf (report prepared for the United Church of Christ, Justice and Witness Ministries);
Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing 'Environmental Justice': The Distributional Effects of Envi-
ronmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787 (1993); Anne E. Lucas, No Remedy for the
Inuit: Accountability for Environmental Harms under U.S. and International Law, in NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: GENDER, SEXUALITY AND ACTIVISM (Rachel
Stein ed., 2004); Mathew D. Adler, Corrective Justice and Liability for Risk Equity: A New
Proposal 156, (Univ. of Pa. Law. Sch. Working Paper, Mar. 2007). In contrast, the
approach followed here characterizes environmental equity as a collective action problem.
For a recent examination of the distributive and corrective justice issues raised by climate
change on an international level, see Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change
Justice (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ. Olin Working Paper, Paper No. 354, 2007) available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1008958.
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I. CLIMATE CHANGE AND INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR
A. Individual Behavior
This Essay makes several core assumptions about the climate
change problem: (1) carbon dioxide and other GHGs are driving a
substantial portion of the observed and expected climate change
(carbon .dioxide accounts for roughly eighty-five percent of the cli-
mate-forcing effects of the leading GHGs, and we refer only to car-
bon dioxide emissions in the rest of this Essay)5; (2) humans are
the principal source of recent increases in carbon dioxide emis-
sions;6 and (3) there is a non-trivial risk of substantial catastrophic
effects from climate change, including large increases in sea level
over the long term.7 We also assume that substantial reductions in
anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions will be required to reduce
the risks of catastrophic climate change, including a leveling off in
roughly the next decade followed by reductions of as much as sixty
to eighty percent over the next fifty years.8 Achieving reductions
of this magnitude in these short time frames will require substantial
emissions reductions from all major source types.
To date, the regulatory measures and proposals generated by
policymakers focus in large part on large industrial sources, the
traditional targets of environmental law. Several federal legislative
proposals, for example, would establish cap-and-trade programs
for such sources.9 Industrial sources are often large emitters, and
industry fits easily into common perceptions about the sources of
pollution.10 Agencies perpetuate these perceptions regarding cli-
mate change through their methods of data collection and dissemi-
5 See James Hansen & Makiko Sato, Greenhouse Gas Growth Rates, 46 PROC. NAT'L.
ACAD. Sci. 16,109, 16,113 (2004).
6 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [IPCC], Climate Change
2007: The Physical.Science Basis, Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assess-
ment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policymak-
ers (Feb. 2, 2007, with corrections made as of Feb. 5, 2007) (prepared by Richard Alley, et
al.) [hereinafter IPCC, Working Group I Report], available at http://www.ipcc.ch/SPM2feb
07.pdf.
7 See generally Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 3, at 1683.
8 See id. at 1687.
9 See generally LARRY PARKER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CLIMATE
CHANGE: GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION BILLS IN THE 110TH CONGRESS (Jan. 31, 2007)
(summarizing legislation). Although these measures would have indirect effects on emis-
sions from individual behavior by increasing the cost of electricity and reducing the emis-
sions per unit of electricity used (or by requiring more efficient and thus less carbon
dioxide-emitting cars), they can be expected to have limited effects on the emissions from
many types of individual behavior. See Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 3, at 1666-
67.
10 See Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 591.
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nation. For example, as demonstrated in Figure 1, the Energy
Information Administration (EIA) of the Department of Energy
disseminates data on overall national carbon dioxide emissions in
four categories:
FIGURE 111
983.1, 18% 1860.2,
33% ED Transportation
N Industrial
1166.8, l Residential
21% * Commercial
1595, 28%
Although the four EIA categories (transportation, industrial,
residential, and commercial) include a discrete category for indus-
try, they do not include a discrete category for individual behavior.
Instead, the EIA frames the data in a way that distributes the emis-
sions from individual behavior across both the residential and
transportation sectors. This framing leaves the reader with the
impression that individual behavior contributes an unrealistically
small share of the total U.S. carbon dioxide emissions.
In another recent article, we assess the contributions of individ-
ual behavior to carbon dioxide emissions by estimating the aggre-
gate and mean carbon dioxide emissions from individual behavior
in the United States in 2000.12 The estimate includes only those
behaviors that are under the substantial and direct control of indi-
viduals, such as personal transportation (personal motor vehicle
use, air travel, and mass transportation use) and household energy
use (electricity use and direct household energy use, such as the gas
burned for hot water heaters). Even using this restrictive defini-
11 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP'T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2004, at 3
(2005), available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/FTPROOT/multifuel/O38404.pdf; U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990-2004,
at 2-10 (2006), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/content/
ResourceCenterPublicationsGHGEmissionsUSEmissionslnventory2006.html (data
presented by spreadsheet is converted to pie chart format).
- 12 For a discussion of the model methodology and results, see Vandenbergh &
Steinemann, supra note 3.
2008]
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tion, individual behavior in the United States generated 4.1 trillion
pounds of carbon dioxide in 2000, an average of over 14,000
pounds per person, which accounts for thirty-two percent of the
U.S. total.13 Although the emissions arise from seemingly innocu-
ous activities such as individual motor vehicle use and home appli-
ance use, the 4.1 trillion pound total is larger than the 3.9 trillion
pound total for all of industry, and it represents eight percent of
the world total.14
B. Equity
Despite the large contribution of individual behavior to carbon
dioxide emissions in the United States, policymakers direct surpris-
ingly little attention toward changing individual behavior. The
framing discussed above may explain the lack of focus on individ-
ual emissions, and the inefficiencies and intrusiveness associated
with regulating individual behavior certainly play a role. Equity
issues also may be surprisingly important. To date, the expert
reports that address climate change equity issues direct much of
their attention toward the inequitable share of the environmental
and human health burdens that low-income and minority commu-
nities bear.1 5 A lack of resources for adaptation, for example, may
cause droughts to pose far greater problems in the developing
world than in the developed world.16 Environmental justice groups
also argue that carbon cap-and-trade schemes will create air toxics
"hot spots" that disproportionately affect minority and low-income
13 Id. at 1677.
14 Id. Others have generated comparable estimates. See, e.g., GERALD T. GARDNER &
PAUL C. STERN, ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 258, Table 10-1 (2d.
ed. 2002) (1996) (estimating that households account for 32.4 percent of direct U.S. energy
use).
15 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [IPCC], Climate Change
2007: Climate Change Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, Working Group II Contribu-
tion Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment Report 8 (Apr. 13,
2007) (prepared by Neil Adger, et al.) [hereinafter IPCC, Working Group II Report] (con-
cluding that Africa is "one of the most vulnerable" to climate change effects because of
"low adaptive capacity").
16 See, e.g., Andrew Revkin, The Climate Divide: Wealth and Poverty, Drought and
Flood: Reports from 4 Fronts in the War on Warming, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2007, at D4
(comparing drought responses in Malawi and Australia and concluding that the "most vul-
nerable countries also tend to be the poorest"). See also CHRISTIAN AID, THE CLIMATE OF
POVERTY: FACTS, FEARS AND HOPE 28-38 (2006), available at http://www.christianaid.org.
uk/Images/climate-of poverty-tcml5-21613.pdf; YIANNA LAMBROU & GRAZIA PIANA,
GENDER: THE MISSING COMPONENT OF THE RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 20-21
(2006).
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communities.17 Some poor communities in the United States also
extend the global "ecological debt" argument to their local com-
munities, arguing that because the rich occupy a larger environ-
mental space, the poor should have the right to consume more
today."'
Rather than extending the environmental justice analysis in this
direction, this Essay focuses on the opportunities arising from the
norms of individuals who accumulate ecological debt through
energy-intensive consumption patterns. We extend the environ-
mental justice analysis to two additional equity concerns: the
impact of income disparities on the adoption of regulatory mea-
sures and on the efficacy of the measures adopted. In both cases,
the equity concerns arise from a conception of individuals not only
as risk receptors, but also as risk creators.
1. Adoption
The concerns about adoption or political viability stem from the
resistance to climate change regulatory measures that can be
expected to arise from the inequitable burdens posed by complying
with these measures.19 Many of the regulatory measures that will
reduce emissions from individual behavior (e.g., efficiency stan-
dards for motor vehicles or appliances, stringent building codes,
carbon taxes, and cap-and-trade schemes for electric utilities) will
increase the costs of electricity and other consumer goods.20
17 See, e.g., Environmental Justice Groups Seek Greater Role in Climate Debate, INSIDE
EPA, Mar. 30, 2007, at 20 [hereinafter Greater Role] (noting that cap-and-trade programs
"may create pollution 'hot spots,' because industrial sources that pay for allowances to
continue emitting greenhouse gases would not automatically reduce other emissions"). See
also ROBERT D. BULLARD, ET AL., supra note 4,at 155.
18 See Duncan McLaren, Environmental Space, Equity and the Ecological Debt, in JUST
SUSTAINABILITIES: DEVELOPMENT IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD 30 (Julian Agyeman et al. eds.,
2003)..
19 See, e.g., Greater Role, supra note 17, at 20 (noting that "[e]nvironmental justice (EJ)
advocates are seeking a greater role in the debate over possible climate change legislation,
charging that even Democratic lawmakers and traditional environmental groups are devot-
ing little attention to how a future greenhouse gas emissions regime could impact low-
income and minority communities").
20 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TRADE-OFFS IN ALLOCATING ALLOWANCES FOR C02
EMISSIONS 3 (Apr. 2007). Proposed federal legislation reflects the concerns about the
higher costs of energy that a cap-and-trade program may have for lower-income individu-
als, but it often takes the form of a mandate to research the impact on poorer individuals.
See, e.g., Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act, S. 280, 110th Cong. § 402 (2007) (intro-
duced by Senators McCain and Lieberman, et al.) [hereinafter CSIA]. Questions of inequi-
table distribution of exposure to toxics based on race or ethnicity dominate much of the
environmental equity or justice debate. See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 4 (examining status
of environmental justice debate). The additional form of inequity discussed in this Essay
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Although some of these measures will save money for consumers
over the long run, many will require up-front expenditures of funds
that low-income individuals do not possess and cannot borrow.'
Low-income individuals thus will be less able to reduce their emis-
sions and will suffer economically over the long run because they
will be unable to afford more efficient cars, appliances, and other
goods. Studies suggest that low-income individuals will be more
likely to pay for higher energy costs through economic sacrifices
than those with more resources.22
In response to the inequitable burdens imposed on low-income
individuals, opponents of climate change regulatory measures will
frame their objections to appeal not only to those on the right, who
contest the seriousness of the climate change threat or object to the
costs or intrusiveness of government intervention, but also to those
on the left, who may be as concerned about equity as environmen-
tal protection. This is more than a hypothetical concern. As men-
tioned at the outset, opponents of more stringent automobile
emissions standards frame these concerns in terms of the costs both
to automobile manufacturers and to those who cannot afford more
expensive vehicles.2 3 Others raise similar objections to the higher
electricity prices that may result from utility emissions standards. 24
In addition, environmental justice groups raise concerns about the
increased energy prices and economic dislocations that may arise
from climate change regulations.25
exerts a strong, if less visible, influence. In some ways this issue is the obverse of the
standard environmental justice problem: Individuals are concerned about the costs they
will bear from the individual behavior changes necessary to achieve environmental goals,
as opposed to the costs they will bear if industry fails to achieve those goals.
21 See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENERGY USE: THE HUMAN DIMENSION 25 (Paul C.
Stern & Elliott Aronson eds., 1,984).
22 See id.; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 20, at 3.
23 See, e.g., Cushman, supra note 1, at A14 (noting that California emissions standards
opponents raised safety concerns regarding low-income individuals). For a review of the
effort to adopt motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions standards in California, see Karen
D. Bettencourt, California's Attempt to Remain the Leader in Environmental Policy: Regu-
lating Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Vehicles Sold in the Golden State, 34 McGEORGE L.
REV. 465, 473-74 (2003).
24 See, e.g., WEINSTEIN & CLOWER, supra note 1 (noting concerns arising from pollution
control efforts for electric utilities).
25 See, e.g., Letter from Gary Cook, Dir., U.S. Climate Action Network, to John D.
Dingell Chairman, House Energy and Commerce Comm., and Rick Boucher, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Energy and Air Quality, House Energy and Commerce Comm. (Mar. 19,
2007) (on file with author) (asserting that "[g]lobal warming legislation must mitigate
against any disproportionate impacts on low-income and vulnerable communities. The
transition to a clean, low-carbon energy future will create economic opportunities and jobs
in numerous sectors while requiring shifts in the economy. The distribution of total benefits
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Furthermore, in many parts of the country, race, ethnicity, and
class are so highly correlated-in fact 26 and in the political imagi-
nation of citizens27-that certain minority groups may even be
blamed for the continued climate threats. This could exacerbate
existing socio-economic tensions. In addition, it could reduce the
political will to address not only the climate change threat, but also
the environmental burdens experienced by these groups (such as
the exposure to air toxics mentioned at the outset).
2. Efficacy
Even if climate change regulatory measures are adopted, the
limited financial resources available to roughly eighteen percent of
the population will mute the effects of those standards. Low-
income individuals have limited capacity to respond to increased
energy prices and the increased availability of energy efficient
goods. This limited capacity will decrease the emissions reductions
that will result from carbon taxes or cap-and-trade schemes that
raise the price of energy. It will also decrease the emissions reduc-
tions that will result from inducing manufacturers to produce more
efficient consumer goods, or from informing individuals of the per-
sonal and social benefits of switching to the more efficient goods.
These lost emissions reductions may be quite important given the
magnitude of the emissions attributable to individual behavior, as
well as the speed and magnitude of the reductions necessary to
reduce the risk of catastrophic climate change. Every one percent
reduction in the overall carbon dioxide emissions from individual
behavior represents roughly forty-one billion pounds of carbon
dioxide, an amount larger than entire industrial sectors.28
Although low-income individuals may be able to undertake rela-
tively minor curtailment activities, such as turning off lights and
turning down thermostats, 29 the largest carbon dioxide emissions
and costs among people and communities should be fair and just. Revenue from the auc-
tion of allowances should fund programs that provide displaced workers with both transi-
tional income, benefits for their families, and tuition for training in alternative fields.
Revenue from the auction of pollution allowances should also help cushion any energy
price increases for low income Americans.").
26 See ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY 6 (2000).
27 See MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE
POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY (1999); PAUL M. Kellstedt, The Mass Media and the
Dynamics of American Racial Attitudes (2003).
28 See Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 3, at 1695.
29 Many low-income individuals may take these steps already for economic reasons. For
a discussion of curtailment and efficiency-enhancing behaviors, see Paul Stern & Gerald
2008]
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reductions often involve efficiency-enhancing activities, not curtail-
ment activities. Examples of efficiency-enhancing activities include
the purchase of more fuel-efficient cars, home appliances, and
heating and air conditioning units, all of which can entail substan-
tial costs. Low-income individuals may be unable to take many of
these steps, even though the steps will generate substantial emis-
sions reductions and save money over the long run.30 In short,
equity issues may reduce not only the likelihood that regulatory
measures will be adopted, but also the emissions reductions
achieved from those measures that are adopted.
II. A REMEDY FOR THE EQUITY PROBLEM
A host of public and private legal measures could be taken to
address the climate change equity issue. For other social problems,
policymakers offer public subsidies in the form of direct payments
or tax incentives, and some subsidies are currently in place to pro-
mote the purchase of efficient cars and other consumer goods.31
These subsidies are difficult to administer efficiently, however, and
enormous public support would be needed to offer them on a scale
necessary to make a meaningful dent in emissions from individual
behavior.32
Gardner, Psychological Research and Energy Policy, 36 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 329, 334-39
(1981).
30 See id. For example, energy efficiency measures such as insulation can reduce house-
hold energy use for space heat by thirty to fifty percent without requiring reductions in
winter temperatures. See id. In addition, in areas that lack mass transportation, low-
income individuals may be unable to reduce gasoline use even when prices surge. The
large number of individuals with financial constraints may be'a contributing factor to the
limited price elasticity of gasoline usage that has been observed in recent studies. For
example, although gas prices doubled between 2001 and 2006, consumption decreased by
only four percent. See J.E. Hughes, C.R. Knittel & D. Sperling, Evidence of a Shift in the
Short-Run Price Elasticity of Gasoline Demand 9 (U. Cal. Davis Inst. of Transp. Studies,
Working Paper No. UCD-ITS-RR-06-16, 2006), available at http://pubs.its.ucdavis.edu/
publication detail.php?id=1050.
31 See, e.g., Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 3, at 1727-28 (discussing motor vehi-
cle efficiency standards).
32 For a discussion of the use of subsidies to reduce GHG emissions, see RICHARD A.
POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 155 (2004). Subsidies have been used to
reduce the contributions of individual behavior to other air emissions, such as in "cash-for-
clunkers" programs directed at reducing emissions of ozone precursors. See, e.g., City of
Kelowana, Cash for Clunkers, http://www.city.kelowna.bc.ca/CM/Page464.aspx (last visited
Dec. 27, 2007). This website outlines a California program offering cash in exchange for
the return of a 1993 or earlier year model vehicle. The individuals wishing to participate
have to apply for one of several incentives that will offer a specified amount of money for a
specified purpose. For example, an individual can turn in a qualifying vehicle to receive
750 dollars toward the purchase of a 2004 or later model automobile that meets certain fuel
efficiency standards.
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Over the last decade, a growing number of scholars pointed to
the important role that public-private and private-private interac-
tions play in performing traditionally governmental functions,33
and a private-private approach may provide the most viable near-
term option. In particular, it may be possible to broaden the retail
carbon offset market through a family of options that generate off-
sets by subsidizing emissions reductions from individuals. This pri-
vate response may prompt near-term emissions reductions,
enhance the efficacy of and the prospects for adoption of public
regulatory measures, and ultimately become an integral part of a
national or international cap-and-trade program. In addition to
achieving the desired behavior change, the proposed private-pri-
vate transactions, because they are individual-to-individual, may
strengthen a sense of collaboration across socio-economic groups
that does not generally arise from schemes that rely only on indi-
vidualized action for collective outcomes. The discussion below
details how a private scheme might be developed and ultimately
integrated into a public cap-and-trade scheme.
A. Carbon Equity Offsets
1. The Retail Carbon Offset Market
Carbon dioxide and other GHGs are emitted into and removed
from the atmosphere by human and natural processes, and the cli-
mate-forcing effect of carbon emissions ultimately arises from their
ambient concentrations. As a result, an emissions source can
reduce its "carbon footprint" by controlling emissions, offsetting
emissions, or some combination of the two. Offsetting can involve
preventing emissions that would otherwise occur (e.g., capturing
methane emissions from landfills) or taking steps that result in car-
bon dioxide being removed from the atmosphere (e.g., planting
trees in tropical areas). Industrial sources that face legal incentives
or social incentives to reduce their carbon footprint can acquire
carbon offsets from a variety of sources. The sources of carbon
offsets include a wide range of activities and entities, but they typi-
cally involve large corporate, government, or non-governmental
organization (NGO) projects such as landfill methane capture,
33 See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45
UCLA L. REV. 1, 21-32 (1997) (identifying collaborative governance arrangements); Jody
Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 592-672 (2000)
(identifying the governance functions performed by public-private hybrids); Michael P.
Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2043-67 (2005)
(identifying the governance functions performed by private-private contracting).
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installation of renewable energy sources, and tropical reforestation
efforts.34 The term "offset" is used here in a generic sense, recog-
nizing that a variety of more precise terms, such as allowances and
renewable energy certificates, are applicable depending on the type
of unit that is traded.
International agreements regarding climate change explicitly
contemplate that countries and firms will purchase and generate
various types of carbon offsets.36 In addition, the European
Union's cap-and-trade program caps carbon emissions on a per-
country basis and allows the major sources of carbon emissions in
each country to achieve their caps by reducing emissions or
purchasing offsets.37 Several states and regions in the United
States have taken steps to create similar trading schemes, and
many of the current legislative proposals in Congress would create
cap-and-trade schemes.38 The details of the offset markets are
complex, but they are not central to the analysis here. The impor-
tant points are that (1) a growing private market in carbon offsets
now exists in the United States and around the world, (2) the
sources of offsets tend to be large projects rather than subsidies to
individuals, and (3) cap-and-trade schemes are on the horizon in
the United States. 39
Industrial cap-and-trade schemes for various forms of pollution
are the subject of an enormous literature in the academy, 40 but
scholars direct less attention to the application of emissions trading
34 See, e.g., TerraPass, http://www.terrapass.com (last visited Dec. 27. 2007) (listing three
sources of offsets: wind power, biomass, and industrial efficiency). Carbon offsets and car-
bon trading raise important environmental and social justice issues. See, e.g., Larry Loh-
mann, Carbon Trading: A Critical Conversation on Climate Change, Privatisation, and
Power, 48 DEv. DIALOGUE 1 (2006) (identifying offset projects that did not generate envi-
ronmental gains or raised social justice concerns).
35 See, e.g., David J. Hayes, Voluntary'Reduction Commitments and the World of Off-
sets, presented at Am. Law Inst./Am. Bar Ass'n and Envtl. Law Inst., Global Warming:
Climate Change and the Law, Washington, D.C., 4-6 (Mar. 22, 2007) (discussing offsets,
renewable energy certificates, and allowances) (copy on file with the author).
36 See, e.g., Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, art. 12, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (authorizing Clean Development Mechanism).
37 See Lohmann, supra note 34, at 1.
38 See Parker, supra note 9.
39 See, e.g., Robert R. Nordhaus & Kyle W. Danish, Assessing the Options for Designing
a Mandatory U.S. Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program, 32 B.C. ENvmL. AF. L. REV. 97
(2005) (discussing greenhouse gas cap-and-trade proposals).
40 See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law,
37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1341 (1985) (proposing domestic emissions trading scheme);
Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal
Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 763 (1999) (examining emissions trading and other options for
addressing global environmental concerns).
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to individuals. 1 The voluntary carbon offset market has neverthe-
less grown dramatically in recent years, increasing from six million
dollars in 2004 to more than 110 million dollars in 2006.42 Retail
carbon offsets are sold by for-profit firms and NGOs.43 For the
most part, the offsets are generated by the same types of large
projects that generate offsets for the industrial market.44
Two aspects of retail carbon offsets are particularly important for
the efficacy of the equity offset concept. The first is that individu-
als must have an incentive to purchase offsets. Although the con-
cept of personal carbon accounts has been floated in the United
Kingdom, the consumer demand for retail carbon offsets is not
driven by legal requirements or economic incentives in the United
Kingdom, the United States, or elsewhere.45 Instead, the growth of
the retail offset market is a result of social incentives: individuals
gain personal and social norm-generated benefits by reducing their
carbon footprints through a combination of emissions reductions
and emissions offsets. The personal norm benefits may include an
enhanced sense of self-esteem and guilt expiation, and the social
norm benefits may include an enhanced reputation in some com-
41 See, e.g., Nordhaus & Danish, supra note 39, at 125 (concluding that "[i]ncluding any
but the very largest domestic landowners in a cap-and-trade program does not appear to be
feasible currently; land ownership is too diffuse, measuring emission impacts of LULUCF
[Land-Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry] and activities is too resource-intensive, and
the relation between practices and emissions varies widely depending on a multiplicity of
local conditions"):
42 See James Kanter, Guilt-Free Pollution. Or Is It?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2007, at C1.
43 There are multiple non-profit organizations that sell carbon offsets. See Carbonfund.
org, http://carbonfund.org (last visited Dec. 27, 2007); Climate Trust, http://www.climate
trust.org (last visited Dec. 27, 2007). A wide range of for-profit retail offset firms also
exist. For example, Native Energy is a privately held renewable energy company that
offers donors the choice between offsetting with wind power or farm methane. See Native
Energy, http://www.nativeenergy.com (last visited Dec. 27, 2007). Natsource is a corporate
partnership between DuPont and Blue Source that provides carbon offset credits from
"select DuPont and Blue Source carbon-reducing projects." Natsource LLC, http://www.
natsource.com/buycredits (last visited Dec. 27, 2007).
44 The Bonneville Environmental Foundation offers offsets derived from replacing tradi-
tional power sources with renewable energy, and donors can choose between offsets that
are ninety-nine percent wind and one percent solar, or ninety percent wind and ten percent
solar. See Bonneville Environmental Foundation, http://www.b-e-f.org (last visited Dec. 27,
2007). Similarly, e-Blue Horizons provides offsets derived from sequestration of landfill
methane. See e-Blue Horizons, http://e-bluehorizons.net (last visited Dec. 27, 2007). Sev-
eral possible exceptions exist, although they are typically directed at large-scale projects.
For example, The Solar Electric Light Fund generates offsets from installing photovoltaics
in low-cost housing. See The Solar Electric Light Fund, http://self.org (last visited Dec. 27,
2007). In addition, The Climate Trust purchases offsets generated by making multi-unit
housing more efficient. See Climate Trust, supra note 43.
45 See Lucy Sherriff, UK Ponders Personal Carbon Allowances, THE REGISTER, July 19,
2006, available at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/07/19/carbon-allowances/print.html.
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munities.4 6 Although each transaction typically takes place indi-
vidually and online, participants may garner additional benefits by
forwarding information about their purchase of retail offsets to
others in their social network. In this way, each transaction may
generate norm-based benefits for the individual, further the spread
of information about retail offsets, and contribute to the formation
of networks of individuals who reduce their carbon footprints.
The second aspect of particular importance to the equity offset
concept is that offsets must generate the promised emissions reduc-
tions. Commentators question whether retail offsets generate gen-
uine emissions reductions and whether individuals who purchase
them avoid taking emissions reduction steps they would otherwise
take.47 Because only informal incentives exist to purchase carbon
offsets, the retail carbon offset market is heavily dependent on
public perceptions that the offsets are legitimate. Only time will
tell whether retail offsets generate genuine reductions, but there is
no reason why private or public enforcement mechanisms cannot
force a reasonably high degree of quality control on offset provid-
ers. A growing literature explores the use of private monitoring
and verification schemes for the regulation of corporate environ-
mental behavior on a domestic and global level.4 s Not surprisingly,
legitimacy concerns also lead to the development of private stan-
dards for carbon offset providers and to the emergence of private
offset verification firms. 49 Although private monitoring and verifi-
cation certainly are not foolproof, if well designed they can offer a
46 See Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 3, at 1706.
47 See Andrew C. Revkin, Carbon-Neutral is Hip, But Is It Green?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29,
2007, at Al. See also CLEAN AIR-COOL PLANET, A CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO RETAIL CAR-
BON OFFSET PROVIDERS (Dec. 2006) (evaluating retail carbon offset providers), available
at http://www.cleanair-coolplanet.org/ConsumersGuidetoCarbonOffsetspdf.
48 See, e.g., BEN CASHORE, GRAEME AULD & DEANNA NEWSOM, GOVERNING
THROUGH MARKETS: FOREST CERTIFICATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF NON-STATE
AUTHORITY 88-126 (2005) (examining Forestry Stewardship Council standards); Errol
Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public Regulation: The Case of For-
estry, 17 EUR. J. INT'L. L 47, 48-57 (2006) (same).
49 Green-c is a certification organization for renewable energy that works with offset
organizations to certify their offset amounts. See Green-e Verification Process, http://www.
green-e.org/getcert re-veri.shtml (last visited Dec. 27, 2007). Another potential way in
which offsets might not generate overall emissions reductions is if individuals *who
purchase offsets avoid taking other steps that they would have taken in the absence of
offsets because of a feeling that they have satisfied their normative obligations. See
Revkin, supra note 47, at 4-1. It is at least equally likely, however, that they will take
additional steps because they have expressed a commitment to reduce their carbon foot-
print and will expect others to do so as well. See Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note
3, at 1721.
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quick and reasonably effective alternative or complement to gov-
ernment regulation. 50
2. Equity Offsets
A variety of approaches could be taken to expand the retail off-
set market to include equity offsets. Successful private equity off-
set schemes will need to generate substantial emissions reductions
in the aggregate, minimize transaction costs, and provide adequate
incentives to induce large numbers of individuals to purchase the
offsets. To draw on social justice norms, the equity offset schemes
also will need to provide information that enables individuals to
understand how the emissions reductions are achieved. In addi-
tion, in the long run private schemes may have far more reach if
they are integrated into a public cap-and-trade program. The first
three criteria necessary for a successful private equity offset
scheme are examined here, and the cap-and-trade integration is
discussed in Part II.B.
a. Potential Emissions Reductions
The potential emissions reductions that could be achieved from
equity offsets are a function of the number of individuals whose
emissions will not be addressed by other programs, the emissions
per individual, and the extent to which the equity offsets reduce
those emissions. As noted above, the potential market includes
more than fifty million individuals who have a limited ability to
change consumer behavior in response to increases in energy prices
or to the availability of more efficient consumer goods. Offsets for
more fuel-efficient private motor vehicles and residential heating
and air conditioning systems provide two important examples of
the emissions reductions potential for equity offsets. Private motor
vehicle use makes up roughly half of the carbon dioxide emissions
from individual behavior, and private motor vehicle use in the
United States constitutes a substantial share of all U.S. carbon
dioxide emissions.51 As a result, small improvements in motor
vehicle emissions could generate carbon dioxide emissions reduc-
tions equal to entire industry sectors. Hybrids and other fuel effi-
cient vehicles are available, but they are expensive. Offsets could
subsidize the purchase of hybrids and other efficient vehicles if a
50 See, e.g., Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private
Contracting in Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913, 944-56 (2007) (examining effi-
cacy of supply-chain contracting and private environmental certification schemes).
51 See Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 3, at 1698.
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means could be found to direct the funds generated from offset
purchases to low-income individuals who seek to replace high-
emitting vehicles with more efficient ones. Similarly, home heating
and air conditioning comprise roughly ten percent of the potential
energy savings (and thus carbon dioxide emissions reductions)
from individual behavior change, and home appliance use com-
prises a smaller but significant share.52 Although many low-income
individuals live in rental units and do not control purchasing deci-
sions for various types of residential heating and air conditioning
equipment and appliances, many others have some degree of con-
trol over these decisions. Accordingly, offsets have the potential to
subsidize the purchase of many types of efficient equipment for
low-income individuals.
b. Transaction Costs
Transaction costs are a substantial barrier, ranging from the costs
of ensuring that buyers' funds are used for their intended purposes
to the costs of soliciting and transferring the funds. One means of
reducing transaction costs is for retail offset sellers to sell generic
offsets and to use NGOs or retailers (e.g., automobile companies
or dealers) as intermediaries in the creation of the offsets. A
national or local NGO, for example, could maintain an account
comprised of offset funds. The NGO could identify, screen, and
certify individuals who meet eligibility criteria, and could provide a
direct payment to an automobile dealer when the dealer certifies
that the eligible individual will purchase the vehicle upon receipt of
the funds.
For-profit firms could also serve as intermediaries. For instance,
an automobile dealer could maintain an equity offset account and
conduct the screening and certification in connection with the
credit check that is often done in any event. Automobile dealers
located in low-income neighborhoods, in particular, may have
incentives to advertise the equity offset scheme to potential car
buyers and offset buyers. Although the market for the Prius and
other hybrids now consists largely of upper-middle income buyers
who benefit from the social meaning attached to the vehicles and
can afford the sticker price, markets for used hybrids and other
fuel-efficient vehicles may become more robust over time.
A similar approach could be used for the purchase of a wide
range of energy-consuming household equipment: large sellers
52 GARDNER & STERN, supra note 14, at 259, Table 10-3.
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such as Home Depot and Lowes have the capacity to reach many
consumers on both sides of the transaction. A large retailer, such
as Wal-Mart (which is promoting a campaign to sell more efficient
products based on the concept of "democratizing sustainability")
may have an incentive to maintain a fund devoted to equity offsets
for consumer appliances. 3 Retailers also may be able to provide
low-cost promotion of equity offsets by marketing the availability
of the offset vouchers at check-out lines. The involvement of large
retailers may add economies of scale that would further reduce
transaction costs.5 4 Whether the intermediary is an NGO, an auto-
mobile dealer, or a retailer, a private third-party validator or certi-
fier may be necessary to ensure that the program is operating as
intended.
In situations where the transaction costs of connecting offset
buyers to specific sellers are high, or where individuals do not have
control over important energy uses (e.g., heating and cooling units,
home appliances, or insulation), offset-generating subsidies may be
more effective and efficient if they are directed at projects that are
conducted on a larger scale, such as low-income housing rehabilita-
tion projects.5 5 A non-profit organization, for example, could dis-
seminate information about these large-scale projects through the
internet. Project descriptions could list the amount needed and the
progress made toward the goal. Donors could access information
about whether they are funding all or part of a new project, keep-
ing the ball rolling on a project that is underway, or providing the
last bit of funding to complete a project. As with the more direct
approaches, private standards, monitoring, and verification may be
necessary in the short term, although government involvement may
be necessary in the long term.
53 See Vandenbergh, supra note 50, at 943, n.135.
54 These approaches need to be attentive to their impact on local small businesses, which
may not be able to secure a piece of the offset-funded purchases.
55 For example, GlobalGiving funds a climate change project involving the installation
of solar panels on ten low-income houses. GlobalGiving, Solar Electric Systems for 10
Low-Income Families, http://www.globalgiving.com/pr/1300/proj1263a.html (last visited
Dec. 27, 2007). At least one organization now offers offsets generated from subsidies for
energy efficiency measures used in low-income housing, but direct offset-generated subsi-
dies for individuals are not available. See e.g., Press Release, Grosolar.com, Global
Resource Options Provides Solar Power to Habitat for Humanity House (April 20, 2006),
available at http://www.renewableenergyaccess.com/rea/partner/story?id=44679 (noting
that Habitat for Humanity partnered with some organizations to install solar panels on
new homes built for low-income individuals).
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c. Incentives
The explosive growth of the retail offset market occurred in the
absence of legal and economic incentives, suggesting that the per-
sonal and social norm-based benefits of reducing one's carbon
footprint are sufficient to induce a large number of individuals to
purchase offsets.-6 These benefits arise at least in part from the
belief of carbon offset purchasers that a small reduction in any one
individual's carbon footprint, when combined with reductions from
others, will have a meaningful impact on global climate change. 7
The climate change problem appears to be distant in time and
geography to many individuals, and it is unclear whether the retail
carbon offset market will plateau after the supply of the most com-
mitted individuals is exhausted.58
The equity offset concept may address this problem by offering
two normative incentives over and above those arising from the
environmental benefits of carbon offsets. First, the offset scheme
may allow a person interested in decreasing her environmental
impact to do so in a way that also reinforces her altruism toward
low-income individuals. Second, the offset scheme may enable
environmental politics to be understood less as a zero-sum game
and more as a collective action problem. The individual-to-individ-
ual offset scheme may enable individuals who are aware of their
disproportionately high consumption patterns to act in a way that
is consistent with their concern for the socioeconomic inequality
that enables them to have a disproportionate impact on the envi-
ronment in the first place. Both the more conservative norm of
altruism for the poor and the more liberal norm of concern about
the injustice of socioeconomic differences may be activated by
these offset schemes.
One way to increase the altruistic aspect of the normative bene-
fits to offset purchasers is to use the internet to link purchasers
56 See Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 3, at 1720-21.
57 See DAVID A. CROCKER & TOBY LINDEN, ETHICS OF CONSUMPTION: THE GOOD
LIFE, JUSTICE, AND GLOBAL STEWARDSHIP (1998); NORA HAENN & RICHARD R. WILK,
THE ENVIRONMENT IN ANTHROPOLOGY: A READER IN ECOLOGY, CULTURE, AND SUS-
TAINABLE LIVING (2006); JUST SUSTAINABILITIES: DEVELOPMENT IN AN UNEQUAL
WORLD (Julian Agyeman et al. eds., 2003). While environmentalists raise concerns that
individuals purchase carbon offsets to distance themselves from responsibility for their
behavior (see Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 3, at 148-49), the equity offset
scheme discussed here may reinforce not only the individual's responsibility to take steps
to address climate change, but also to take steps to address economic inequities.
58 See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode & Lee Ross, Environmental Values and Behaviors: Strate-
gies to Encourage Public Support for Initiatives to Combat Global Warming, 26 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 155 (2007) (examining public beliefs and values regarding climate change).
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directly with individuals who are willing to use the subsidy for the
intended purpose.59 This approach would require that an organiza-
tion provide a forum for individuals to post information about spe-
cific subsidy requests. The organization would also screen
individuals for eligibility so that the posting would be accurate and
would avoid disclosure of specific personal financial information.
Another way to increase the economic justice aspect of the norma-
tive benefits to offset purchasers would be to link those purchasers
with individuals in communities with particular demographic char-
acteristics. In a hybrid model, communities (for example a church
community) might adopt another (church) community for an offset
program.
Although a variety of approaches are possible, all will require an
understanding of the social context and norms of the individuals
who could benefit from the offsets as well as the norms of those
who purchase them. For some this will mean overcoming cultural
assumptions about who cares about the environment. 60 Sensitivity
to localized social contexts will be necessary to avoid a wide range
of potential barriers to the use of equity offset-based subsidies.
B. Integration into a National Cap-and-Trade Scheme
In addition to its other benefits, a private equity offset scheme
ultimately may demonstrate the feasibility of folding individual
behavior into a national cap-and-trade program. Numerous fed-
eral legislative proposals include GHG cap-and-trade programs
that focus on large industrial sources, and there is a growing con-
sensus that Congress will enact some form of cap-and-trade pro-
gram in the next several years.61  These proposals include
59 An example of an organization that does this regarding international charitable giving
is GlobalGiving. GlobalGiving claims to have overhead of about ten percent of their total
donations. GlobalGiving, GlobalGiving Corporate Fact Sheet, http://www.globalgiving.
com/aboutus/media/backgrounder.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2007). Another example of
an organization that uses the internet to connect donors and recipients is Locks of Love.
See Locks of Love, http://www.locksoflove.org (last visited Sept. 20, 2007). In many cases,
these organizations not only enable the donor to make a prompt gift with low transaction
costs but also convey information to potential donors. See, e.g., Breast Cancer 3-Day,
http://www.the3day.org/site/pp.asp?c=pmL6JnO8KzE&b=2182537 (last visited Sept. 20,
2007) (providing information about breast cancer).
60 See, e.g., Carolyn Finney, Black Faces, White Spaces: African Americans and the
Great Outdoors (2006) (Ph.D Dissertation, Clark University) (on file with author) availa-
ble at http://www.cnr.bcrkeley.edu/community-forestry/People/Final%20Reports/Finney%
20Final%2OReport.pdf (examining conceptions of race and the environment).
61 See Despite Court Ruling, EPA Resists Calls for Mandatory GHG Program, 28 INSIDE
EPA 14, Apr. 6, 2007, at 2 (noting that one source believes that "[t]here is no longer a
question there will be greenhouse gas regulation at the federal level, the question is which
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downstream cap-and-trade approaches that focus on electric utili-
ties and other large industrial carbon dioxide sources, as well as
upstream approaches that focus on the producers of natural gas,
petroleum, and coal.62
Whether taking the downstream or upstream approach, the cap-
and-trade legislative proposals offered to date would reduce emis-
sions from individual behavior only indirectly by increasing the
price of various sources of energy and increasing energy efficiency
incentives for utilities and other industrial sectors.63 Downstream
measures alone, however, could leave more than half of the current
sources of emissions largely untouched. 64 In some cases, the pro-
posals would set aside a portion of the allowance trading proceeds
or initial allowance auctions to subsidize adaptation activities for
low-income individuals, such as a provision in one bill that would
mitigate the effects of high energy prices on low-income consum-
ers.65 These types of subsidies will address the equity problem that
arises from the harm to low-income individuals caused by high
energy prices, but they will do little or nothing to address the
obverse problem of providing low-income individuals with the
resources necessary to reduce their contribution to carbon dioxide
emissions.
Although none of the leading legislative proposals would enable
low-income individuals to generate tradable offsets from the
institution will be the first to do it."). For examples of recently introduced legislation, see
CSIA, S. 280, 110th Cong. § 402 (2007) (proposing upstream and downstream trading pro-
grams); Clean Air Planning Act of 2006, S. 2724, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006) (introduced by
Senator Carper et al., proposing a trading system for emissions from the electric generating
sector).
62 For a discussion of upstream and downstream approaches, see Nordhaus & Danish,
supra note 39, at 120.
63 For example, the CSIA incorporates individual automobile emissions into its statutory
scheme indirectly by including an upstream program that would require petroleum refiners
and importers to hold a tradable allowance for each ton of greenhouse gas emitted from
the petroleum they sell. CSIA, S. 280, 110th Cong. § 121(a)(3) (2007).
64 Nordhaus & Danish, supra note 39, at 128 (concluding that a large-source down-
stream cap-and-trade program could reach, at most, "less than half of the nation's C02
emissions").
65 The CSIA would establish a Climate Change Credit Corporation (CCCC). See CSIA
§ 201. The CCCC would be required to "use the tradable allowances to reduce costs borne
by consumers as a result of the greenhouse gas reduction requirements of [the CSIA]. The
reductions.. .may include arrangements for preferential treatment to consumers who can
least afford any such increased costs." Id. § 202(b)(1). The CSIA also provides that "the
[CCCCI shall allocate a portion of the proceeds derived from its trading activities to fund-
ing climate change adaptation and mitigation programs to assist low-income populations
identified... as having particular needs in addressing the impact of climate change." Id.
§ 202(4).
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purchase of energy-efficient consumer goods, integration of equity
offsets into a larger cap-and-trade scheme is conceptually possible.
Commentators who examine the inclusion of individuals in a cap-
and-trade system assume that transaction costs present an over-
whelming barrier.66 Yet many of the transaction costs involved in
industrial cap-and-trade programs arise from the allocation of
emissions rights based on emissions baselines for those sources. 67
The number of individuals who might generate equity offsets
exceeds fifty million, and individual baselines would be almost
impossible to establish, but neither small numbers of sources nor
verifiable baselines are essential if individuals are viewed as
sources of emissions offsets, rather than as regulated entities. An
equity offset program, for example, could generate tradable offsets
from individuals without capping any one individual's emissions if
the program is limited to those individuals who are highly unlikely
to be able to take the steps that generate the offset (e.g., insulating
a house or purchasing a more efficient vehicle or household equip-
ment) in the absence of the subsidy from the purchaser of the off-
set. To reduce transaction costs, the emissions reductions could be
quantified using standard assumptions regarding the characteristics
and usage of the goods involved. For example, the emissions from
replacing a mid-sized sedan with a hybrid, assuming average usage,
might be presumed to reduce emissions by a fixed number of tons
of carbon dioxide-equivalents per year.68 Provided that the offsets
eliminate emissions that would not otherwise be eliminated,
problems arising from double-counting should be minimized.
To the extent transaction costs would arise from creating and
documenting many small offsets, corporate or NGO intermediaries
could bundle the offsets and sell them in sufficiently large units to
create economies of scale. A mix of public and private monitoring
and verification could reduce government administrative costs.
Concerns arising from integrating equity offsets into a national or
global cap-and-trade scheme could be vetted in advance via the
66 See, e.g., Nordhaus & Danish, supra note 39, at 159 (concluding that "[a]n economy-
wide downstream cap-and-trade program - because it implies the regulation of literally
millions of individual GHG sources, including cars and homes - would be difficult and
costly to administer, and therefore is not a viable prospect for a domestic GHG regulatory
program").
67 See id. at 120 (noting that "cap-and-trade programs are best suited to regulation of
emission sources that can be readily measured and monitored").
68 The retail offset firm TerraPass uses a similar tiered approach rather than attempting
to calculate the specific emissions attributable to any one vehicle. See TerraPass, supra
note 34.
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new private equity offset market. To address any remaining con-
cerns about the actual emissions reductions achieved, a cap could
be imposed on the percentage that equity offsets could comprise of
all tradable units. Several current bills take an analogous approach
to other types of offsets.69
III. CONCLUSION
A successful response to climate change will require attending to
the effects of socioeconomic inequality, including both the histori-
cal disproportionate burden of environmental harms on the poor
and minorities, and the disproportionate financial capacity to
reduce emissions. The family of options proposed here accounts
for these concerns in the design of public and private responses to
climate change. Instead of adversarial politics, the equity offset
schemes proposed would re-characterize the political challenge of
the climate change crisis as one that is beyond adversarial democ-
racy.70 Equity offsets would harness and extend the social influ-
ences that are driving the current retail carbon offset markets,
enabling the individuals who purchase equity offsets to benefit
from complying with emerging carbon emissions norms and norms
regarding altruism or social justice. These schemes would not
enable offset purchasers to evade personal responsibility (or to
rename it as "charity"), but rather to share that responsibility with
others. Although the design and implementation of equity offset
schemes along these lines will face obstacles, these schemes may
not only provide additional normative incentives for individuals to
reduce their carbon footprints but also reduce resistance to the
adoption of regulatory measures and enhance the efficacy of the
measures that are adopted. In the long run, equity offset schemes
may become an essential part of the current and proposed public
cap-and-trade programs that currently focus largely on industrial
sources. Equity offsets thus have the potential to become an inte-
gral part of the social response to climate change.
69 See, e.g., CSIA, S. 280, 110th Cong. §§ 144, 145 (2007).
70 See JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY (1980).
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